How Can Canada Spend 2% of GDP on Defence but Have Only 42.3% RCAF Readiness?
Canadians are being told two things at once.
First, the federal government says Canada has now met NATO’s long-standing target of spending 2% of GDP on defence. Second, the Department of National Defence’s own reporting says only 42.3% of Canada’s aerospace key fleets were serviceable in 2024–25.
At first glance, those two facts seem impossible to square. If Canada is finally spending enough, why are so many aircraft not ready?
The answer is that defence spending and military readiness are not the same thing.
The 2% NATO target is an input measure. It tells us how much money Canada is putting into the defence and security bucket compared with the size of the economy. In 2025–26, the government says Canada invested more than $63 billion in defence, including spending by DND, the Canadian Armed Forces, and other federal departments. More than $14 billion of that came from other departments and agencies, including areas such as cyber security, space, procurement, veterans support, intelligence and related security functions. (Canada)
That may be valid under NATO’s accounting rules. NATO’s definition of defence expenditure includes more than just soldiers, ships, aircraft and ammunition. It can include pensions, research and development, stockpiling, certain operations, NATO infrastructure contributions, and the military component of mixed civilian-military activities. (NATO)
But readiness is different. Readiness asks a much harder question: can the force actually deploy and fight when needed?
That is where Canada’s numbers become troubling. DND reported that, in 2024–25, only 30% of planned readiness was achieved for the core concurrent mission set. It also reported that 61.3% of force elements were ready for operations against a 90% target. For aerospace key fleets, only 42.3% were serviceable to meet training, readiness and operational requirements. (Canada)
That 42.3% figure does not mean “only 42.3% of aircraft are combat-ready fighters.” It is a broader serviceability measure across aerospace key fleets. It also does not mean 100% serviceability is realistic; DND itself notes that having every key fleet fully serviceable at the same time is not operationally feasible. But the number is still poor. It was measured against an 85% target, and DND has now revised the target to 70% by 2032. (Canada)
So how can spending rise while readiness remains weak?
Because much of defence spending does not immediately produce operational capability. Money can be committed to ships that will not arrive for years, aircraft that still require pilots and maintainers, buildings not yet constructed, supply chains not yet repaired, and programs still stuck in procurement. A cheque written today does not make an old aircraft younger tomorrow.
This is especially true after decades of deferred investment. If a military has aging equipment, thin spare-parts stocks, personnel shortages, delayed infrastructure and slow procurement, then new money first fills holes. It does not instantly create combat power.
DND’s own explanation for the 42.3% aerospace serviceability number is blunt. The department cited personnel shortages, supply-chain disruption, increasing maintenance demands from aging platforms, planned major maintenance, unplanned equipment problems, underfunding and obsolescence. (Canada)
In plain language: Canada is paying more now partly because it allowed too much to decay earlier.
This distinction matters. The government can truthfully say Canada has reached 2% of GDP in defence spending. But that does not mean the Canadian Armed Forces are healthy. It does not mean the RCAF has enough pilots, technicians, parts, hangars, simulators, weapons and serviceable aircraft to meet every serious contingency. It does not mean Canada has converted spending into military effect.
The better question is not simply, “Did Canada hit 2%?”
The better questions are:
How much of that 2% produces deployable military capability?
How much is future procurement rather than current readiness?
How many aircraft, ships and vehicles are serviceable today?
How many pilots, technicians and crews are trained and retained?
How much ammunition and spare-parts depth exists?
When will today’s spending become actual operational power?
Canada deserves credit if it is finally spending more seriously on defence. But the public should not confuse accounting progress with operational readiness.
The 2% figure tells us Canada is spending more. The 42.3% aerospace serviceability figure tells us why that spending is overdue.
Both can be true. And together, they tell a sobering story: Canada is trying to rebuild military capability while still living with the consequences of years of neglect.
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